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Abstract - This paper adopts a multi-commodity habit formation model to study whether unhealthy 
behaviours are related, i.e. whether there are contemporaneous and inter temporal complementarities in 
Italian consumption of alcohol and tobacco. Own and crossprice elasticities, as well as the income 
elasticities, are calculated from the parameters of a semi-reduced system estimated on aggregate annual time 
series for alcohol and tobacco expenditures over the period 1960-2002. Own price elasticities are negative 
and tobacco appears to be more responsive than alcohol demand, although both responses are less than unity. 
Cross price elasticities are also negative and asymmetric showing that alcohol and tobacco are complements. 
Whereby a ”double dividend” could then be exploited, because public policy needs to tackle the 
consumption of one good only to control the demand of both. The asymmetry in the values of the cross price 
elasticities coupled with the relative magnitude of the own price responses suggest that the optimal strategy 
for maximizing public revenues through increases in ”sin” goods excise taxation would be to raise alcohol 
taxation more than tobacco. Finally, past consumption of one addictive good does not significantly reinforce 
current consumption of the other addictive good. 
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 1 Introduction
Since 1992, the World Health Organization (WHO) has advocated a combined approach to
reduce harm resulting from the use of alcohol, tobacco and illegal drugs. To this aim, the
European Parliament has identiﬁed the main initiatives to be taken within the European
Union (EU) to modify individual behaviours related to harmful consumption of alcohol, drugs,
food and cigarettes. In Italy both alcohol and tobacco demand have followed a decreasing
trend since 1985. However a further reductiono fb o t hi sr e q u i r e da sam e a s u r et or e d u c e
the public health care costs implied by their negative health consequences and the additional
negative externalities their consumption and addiction may cause such as eﬀects on crime, on
injuries caused in motor vehicle accidents and on labour market achievement. There is a large
number of studies investigating the determinants of alcohol and tobacco demand separately,
but few of them have dealt with their interaction explicitly recognizing their addictive nature
(see for instance Goel and Morey (1995), Decker and Schwartz (2000), Bask and Melkersson
(2004), Picone et al. (2004), Fanelli and Mazzocchi (2004)). Moreover, except for Bask and
Melkersson and Fanelli and Mazzocchi, empirical papers are usually not based on any formal
theoretical framework.
When modelling the demand for a single addictive good, one of the most popular framework
is the rational addiction (RA) model proposed by Becker and Murphy (1988), which under
a quadratic utility function leads to a simple linear speciﬁcation with testable hypotheses.
The two key elements in their analysis are the interdependency of past, current and future
consumption, which characterizes addictive goods, and the assumption of individual rationality,
that is, of far-sighted consumers who can foresee the consequences of their current actions.
The purpose of this paper is to test an extension of the rational addiction model that in-
cludes consumption of two addictive goods: alcohol and tobacco. There are two main reasons
for doing this: the ﬁrst is to investigate their contemporaneous substitutability or comple-
mentarity. Public policies, in many countries, have focused on cigarettes and liquor as prime
targets for excise taxation for at least two reasons: consumption reduction and revenue gen-
eration. Information on the way in which these "sin" goods are related, given by the cross
price elasticities of demand, may allow a better coordination of these public policies. If they
are complements for instance, we could obtain a reduction in consumption of both goods by
raising the price of just one of them. On the other hand, if the two are substitutes, measures
aimed at reducing one of them could produce the undesired eﬀect of reinforcing the other
1good’s consumption. Stated diﬀerently, it may not be suﬃcient to consider the use of addictive
substances separately to design proper policy guidance, such as the optimal level of taxation,
the eﬀects of diﬀerent forms of regulation and the impacts of legalization (Palacios-Huerta,
2003, p.18).
A second aim of the paper is to study whether there is an inter temporal relationship
between these two goods, because inter temporal complementarity, for instance, could be in-
terpreted as evidence of a gateway eﬀect. There now exist a bulk of empirical research (Kandel,
1975; Pacula, 1997; 1998; Kenkel et al., 2001), suggesting the so called “gateway hypothesis”:
past consumption of alcohol or cigarettes (legal drugs) could reinforce current use of illegal
addictive substances. The same eﬀect can be thought to apply to two legal substances: alcohol
(tobacco) use could increase the likelihood of consuming tobacco (alcohol). An implication of
the gateway hypothesis is that conventional estimates of the optimal tax on alcohol or ciga-
rettes may be biased downwards, because they ignore the inter temporal relationship between
the two. Another implication is that if alcohol, for instance, is a gate to tobacco consumption,
eﬀective measures of reduction of the former could mitigate initiation of the latter. If there
is sequencing in the use of these two commodities and if such sequencing is causal in nature,
then public policy may be eﬀective at reducing the demand of one of the two by raising the
marginal cost of the initiation drug.
Our estimates refer to multi-commodity addiction with a non common habit stock and are
based on time series of alcohol and tobacco expenditures in Italy from 1960 to 2002. Since we
use aggregate data, a battery of diagnostic tests takes into account some of the warnings put
forward by Auld and Grootendorst (2004) concerning the estimation of RA models with this
kind of data.
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 brieﬂy reviews the existing literature on the
relationship between alcohol and tobacco consumption; section 3 explains the rationale for a
common versus non common habit stock in modeling the demand functions; in section 4 we
present the theoretical model; the empirical strategy and the estimation results are described
in section 5 and 6; section 7 concludes.
2 Previous Studies
There is a large literature investigating the demand for alcohol and cigarettes separately. More
realistically, these behaviours are jointly determined, but few empirical works have analysed
these coaddiction models. They include: Jimenez and Labeaga (1994); Dee (1999); Decker and
2Schwartz (2000); or their contemporaneous and inter temporal interdependence: Jones (1989);
Goel and Morey (1995); Bask and Melkersson (2004); Picone, Frank and Sloan (2004) and
Fanelli and Mazzocchi (2004). Moreover, most of these empirical papers on multiple addictive
goods are usually not based on any formal theoretical framework even though multiple habits
and addictions seem to be the rule rather than the exception1 and the relevance of the issue
has been stressed in the literature (Palacios-Huerta, 2003, p. 4).
Decker and Schwartz (2000) consider two separate static demand equations for alcohol and
cigarettes where each equation includes, among the explanatory variables, the price of both
goods. They use individual level data from 45 states in the US from 1985 to 1993 taken from the
Behavioural Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) and estimate a model which separates
participation from consumption. Equilibrium elasticities only are estimated due to the lack
of dynamics in their speciﬁcation. The overall cross price elasticity of alcohol with is +0.50
suggesting that the two addictive goods are substitutes, while that of cigarettes with respect
to the price of alcohol is −0.14. This asymmetry, both in the signs and in the magnitudes, is
mainly due to diﬀerences in the price responsiveness of the participation decisions2.
Goel and Morey (1995) use a pooled set of data organized by year and state on US ciga-
rette and liquor consumption for the period 1959-1982. The empirical speciﬁcation includes
habit persistence through lagged consumption of each good in both equations. They ﬁnd a
substitution relationship too, though cross price eﬀects diﬀer markedly: from +0.33 for liquor
to +0.10 for cigarettes. This may be considered as potential evidence of diﬀerences in social
norms regarding smoking and drinking. Namely, there may be some asymmetry in the number
of people who smoke and drink liquor and those who only smoke or only drink liquor. The
same idea is put forward in the paper by Picone et al. (2004) where the increases in the costs
and barriers to smoking in the US are used to study the relationships between smoking and
drinking behaviors. Starting from the observation that smokers consume twice the amount
1The Italian Health Institute (Istituto Superiore di Sanità) reports that, over the last years, the number of
people treated for multiple addictions (polysubstance use) has steadily increased. See http://www.iss.it/ossfad/
for further details.
2Decker and Schwartz distinguish between consumption and participation for both goods. The overall cross
price elasticity of alcohol, for instance, with respect to cigarettes is obtained by adding two components: the
cross price elasticity calculated from the demand for alcohol over all individuals (both drinkers and non drinkers)
and the cross price elasticity calculated from the demand for alcohol among drinkers only. In the case of alcohol
these two components have the same sign and add up to +0.50. In the case of cigarettes, instead, the -0.19
cross price elasticity of smoking participation contrasts with the +0.04 cross price elasticity among smokers
only, adding up to an overall elasticity of -0.14.
3of alcohol per capita as non smokers do and that as many as 80% of alcoholics smoke, they
try to investigate the relationship between smoking and drinking using the ﬁrst six waves of
the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS). They also test whether past cigarettes and alcohol
consumption aﬀect current alcohol consumption as predicted by co-addiction models. Their
main ﬁndings can be summarised as follows: past consumption of cigarettes has a positive ef-
fect on current alcohol consumption; increasing the cost of smoking (through the introduction
of smoking bans) reduces alcohol consumption; ﬁnally, higher cigarette prices increase alcohol
consumption.
Jones (1989) estimates budget shares equations using an Almost Ideal Demand System
(AIDS) which includes four categories of alcoholic beverages and tobacco, using aggregate
quarterly expenditure data for the UK over the period 1964-1983. He ﬁnds tobacco to be a
complement to all four categories of alcoholics. Habit formation is depicted in the model by
lagged consumption for each commodity.
A similar study has been carried out by Fanelli and Mazzocchi (2004) who, in addition,
develop a dynamic modeling approach to the AIDS, which is consistent with the rational addic-
tion theory and with the hypothesis of adjustment costs. A strong complementarity between
alcohol and tobacco consumption is found in the data. Jimenez and Labeaga (1994) estimate
static demand equations in a demand system context because of lack of time variability in the
data: a cross section of individual expenditures taken from the Spanish Family Expenditure
Survey (SFES). The resulting cross price elasticity of tobacco consumption with respect to
alcohol price is, on average, -0.78 suggesting a rather strong complementarity between the two
commodities.
D e e( 1 9 9 9 )p r o v i d e se v i d e n c ef o rar o b u s tc o m plementarity between drinking and smoking
among teen agers using pooled cross sections from the 1977-1992 Monitoring the Future (MTF)
surveys of high school seniors. They evaluate such complementarity by exploiting the exogenous
variation in the full prices of alcohol and tobacco generated by changes in cigarette taxes
and state minimum legal drinking ages. Contemporaneous complementarity or substitution is
evaluated through the estimated coeﬃcients of the price of alcohol in the cigarette equation
and of the price of cigarettes in the alcohol equation, whereas no elasticities are calculated.
Finally, Bask and Melkersson (2004) model the demand for alcohol and cigarettes as two
separate equations and then as a simultaneous system. The dependence of current consumption
from past consumption is modeled assuming a non common habit stock, i.e. consumption
is only a function of its own stock of past consumption and not of the joint stock of both
goods. They use aggregate annual time series on sales volumes for the period 1955-1999 in
4Sweden. Both cross price elasticities turn out to be negative thus showing that alcohol and
cigarettes are complements in consumption. Some of their ﬁndings are, however, problematic.
The coeﬃcients on lead and lagged tobacco consumption, in the tobacco equation, are always
negative thus contradicting the theory. Secondly, standard errors for the elasticites are never
reported and there is no comment on the values of the calculated cross price elasticities. Finally,
looking at equations 7 and 8 one forms the opinion that there is only one discount rate. Table
6, however, presents two sets of implied rates, though the ﬁgures referring to equation 8 are
not calculated, because rational addiction is not present.
Table 1 summarizes results from previous studies on cigarettes and alcohol. In the table,
εa,t is the cross price elasticity of alcohol with respect to tobacco and εt,a is the cross price
elasticity of tobacco with respect to alcohol. They measure the percentage change in the
quantity demanded of one addictive good following a 1% change in the price of the other.
3 Modeling the Stock of Alcohol and Tobacco Consump-
tion
A growing body of medical evidence shows that alcohol and tobacco consumption are related
(Decker and Schwartz, 2000, p. 4), due to a range of biological and psychological factors.
Walton (1972) for instance, found that 97% of a sample of male alcoholics were smokers. Bobo
et al. (1987) reported that 92.3% of the staﬀ interviewed in an alcohol treatment facility
estimated that 75 to 100% of their patients smoked. In general, it has been observed that
individuals who declare currently using alcohol, very often report current use of tobacco as well.
Recently, Picone et al. (2004) stressed that the hypothesis according to which smoking and
drinking behaviours are positively correlated is supported by a large epidemiological literature.
These stilized facts seem consistent with the conjecture that smoking and drinking reﬂect
a ”common addictive personality pattern”. An explanation for it is the so called ”learning
based explanation”: smoking and drinking may serve as mutual cues in the sense that the
use of one substance stimulates the consumption of the other. This may be due to situational
factors: sitting in a bar having a drink may trigger smoking; or to pharmacological factors:
the use of alcohol reinforces the eﬀect of nicotine and vice versa. While their contemporaneous
relationship has been explored in the literature using diﬀerent modeling approaches, the inter
temporal relationship between alcohol and tobacco consumption, i.e. the hypothesis that their
combined usage may also depend on past consumption of both, has yet to be taken into
5account. This is, however, quite important, because a positive eﬀect of past consumption of
one substance on current use of the other is necessary in order to have a so called "Gateway
Eﬀect": i.e. past consumption of a legal addictive substance may reinforce the current use of
an illicit addictive drug. Pacula (1997) reports that deﬁning a common capital stock is crucial
(p. 522) since a Gateway Eﬀect occurs when past consumption of one substance increases
the marginal utility of the other, thus inducing the individual to actually consume the latter
substance3. Her analysis is generalisable to consider two legal and harmful substances such as
alcohol and tobacco, but she does not explicitly introduce any functional speciﬁcation for the
common stock.
The empirical literature on the interaction between alcohol and tobacco consumption has
modeled the joint habit stock in two diﬀerent ways. A common habit stock is assumed when
the following linear speciﬁcation holds (Bask-Melkersson, 2003) : H(t)=c(t − 1) + s(t − 1)
(where c is cigarettes and s is snus, a particular kind of smokeless tobacco). This formulation
of the habit stock implies that past consumption of any of the two goods gives rise to a single
stock accumulation. The two goods are perfect substitute, i.e. they show an inﬁnite elasticity
of substitution. We do not know of speciﬁcations of the common habit stock other than the
linear additive one used by Bask and Melkersson. This speciﬁcation, however, is not reasonable
when applied to alcohol and tobacco. A more general formulation is to assume that past
consumption of both goods leads to the accumulation of two separate habit stocks. Assuming
that each habit stock is equal to its own past consumption gives (Bask and Melkersson, 2003):
St = At−1; Ht = Tt−1,w h e r eAt is alcohol and Tt is tobacco. The justiﬁcation for two separate
habit stocks is that there are diﬀerent social, psychological and physiological factors connected
with each addictive good and one cannot freely substitute one addiction source for another.
3At r u eG a t e w a yE ﬀect occurs when consumption of one substance increases the subsequent likelihood of
initiation of other substances by increasing their marginal utility of consumption. Let us consider alcohol
and tobacco and suppose we want to test whether tobacco is a gate to alcohol. An individual will initiate
consumption of alcohol, if its marginal utility, evaluated at zero consumption, is greater than its marginal cost,
i.e. its price. What makes, at zero consumption, the marginal utility of alcohol greater than its price, is the
existence of habit formation with respect to the gate good, i.e. past consumption of tobacco (see Pacula, 1997,
p. 522).
64 Theoretical Framework
In the RA framework (Becker and Murphy, 1988) the behaviour of an addicted consumer is
characterized by reinforcement and tolerance. Tolerance means that the marginal utility of
the stock of past consumption is negative; reinforcement, on the other hand, requires that an
increase in past consumption raises the marginal utility of current consumption. An implication
of reinforcement is that levels of consumption in adjacent time periods are complements. In
addition, the RA framework implies that consumers also take into account the future negative
consequences of their behavior so that, for reinforcement to occur, the increase in the marginal
utility of current consumption following an increase in past consumption must be greater than
the reduction in the present value of future consumption due to the harmful consequences
of addiction. Underlying the RA theory are several assumptions that have led to a bulk of
critical literature and have given rise to new classes of addiction models. In particular: i)
initiation in consumption is not explained: the individual consumes positive amounts of the
addictive good; ii) s/he can accurately predict future prices and other demand shifters; iii)
s/he is not only rational and forward looking, but also time consistent (O’Donoghue-Rabin,
1999; Gruber-Köszegi, 2001); s/he does not have self control problems (Akerlof, 1991; Elster
and Skog, 1999); the model fails to explain important aspects of addictive behaviour, such
as temptation (Gul-Pesendorfer, 2005); mistaken behaviour (Lowenstein-O’Donoghue-Rabin,
2003); cue-triggered decision processes (Bernheim-Rangel, 2005).
Nevertheless, the model is still very popular among practitioners, because it leads to a
simple linear speciﬁcation with testable hypothesis.
Following Andersson et al. (2003) and Bask and Melkersson (2004), given two addictive
goods consumed, such as Alcohol, A, and Tobacco, T, the habit stock variable is:
St = At−1 + δTt−1 (1)
Ht =( 1 − δ)Tt−1
where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1.W h e nδ =0we have a non common habit stock, i.e. past consumption
of each good leads to the accumulation of two diﬀerent stocks. δ =1is instead the case of a
joint habit stock.
The representative consumer’s problem is to maximize the following function:




t−1U (Ct,A t,T t,S t,H t) (2)
7where Ct is consumption at time t of a non addictive good (used as numeraire), At is
consumption of alcohol at time t, Tt is consumption of tobacco at time t,a n dSt and Ht are the
habit stock variables, whereas β is the discount factor 1/(1+r),w i t hr being the inter temporal
rate of time preference. The utility function has the following properties: UA < 0; UAA < 0;
UT < 0; UTT < 0; UC < 0; UCC < 0. Moreover, the standard properties of addiction: tolerance
and reinforcement are assumed to hold: UH < 0; UHH < 0; US < 0; USS < 0; UAS > 0;
UTH > 0. Drinking and smoking are assumed to have no eﬀect on the marginal utility derived
from consuming the composite good C and vice versa: UAC = UTC = USC = UHC =0 . Finally,
if the consumption of one good lessens the quitting of the other, a necessary condition is that
smoking aﬀects the marginal utility derived from the other good negatively, i.e. UTA < 0 and
UHS < 0. On the other hand, if smoking reinforces the craving for alcohol and viceversa, the
necessary condition is UTA > 0 and UHS > 0. Thus, a necessary condition for tobacco to be
a gate to alcohol is UHS > 0 and for alcohol to be a gate to tobacco is USH > 0.T h e i n t e r




t−1 (Yt + pAtAt + pTtTt)=W (3)
where W is the present value of wealth.
When the instantaneous utility function is quadratic and the inter temporal rate of time
preference is equal to the market interest rate solving equation (2) generates the following
structural demand equations:
At = β10 + β11At−1 + β12At+1 + β13Tt−1 + β14Tt + β15Tt+1 + β16pAt (4)
Tt = β20 + β21Tt−1 + β22Tt+1 + β23At−1 + β24At + β25At+1 + β26pTt (5)
Where βi0 > 0, βi1 > 0, βi2 > 0, βi6 < 0 and βi1 =( 1+r)βi2with i =1 ,2; that is: current
consumption is positively related to past and future consumption and negatively related to
own current price. Testing these parameter restrictions has in the literature been used as a
validation of the rational addiction model. The signs of the remaining parameters depend on
data, i.e. on how the consumption of the two goods aﬀects each other. One of the impications
of the coaddiction model and the Gateway Eﬀect is that past levels of cigarette consumption
should reinforce current consumption of alcohol and conversely βi3 > 0( i =1 ,2).W h e n a
linear common habit stock is assumed (δ =0 ) , there is an addictional parameter restriction
8imposed on both equations: βi1 = βi3 i =1 ,2, i.e. lagged consumption of tobacco has the
same eﬀect as lagged consumption of alcohol, regardless of the equation.
Combination of equations (4) and (5) leads to the following semi-reduced system:
At = α10 + α11At−1 + α12At+1 + α13Tt−1 + α14Tt+1 + α15pAt + α16pTt (6)
Tt = α20 + α21Tt−1 + α22Tt+1 + α23At−1 + α24At+1 + α25pTt + α26pAt (7)
Where the α0s are non linear combinations of the β
0s and their expected signs cannot be
deduced from the theory4.
For policy purposes, the long run direct and cross price elasticities of demand are of interest,
because they measure the response between steady states, to a permanent change in price. For
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If, in the statistical model, we add a proxy of disposable income, Yt , to the set of explanatory
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I nt h ec a s eo fo n ea d d i c t i v eg o o d ,t h ei n t e rt e m p o r a lr a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c e ,r, can be easily
derived from the structural parameters. In the semi-reduced system, however, the parameters
4See Bask and Melkersson (2003) for explicit expressions for these parameters.
5αi7(i =1 ,2) is the semi-reduced parameter of expenditure (Y) when this variable is included among the
regressors.
9of each equation are non linear functions of the parameters in equations (4) and (5) and their
expected sings cannot be deduced from the theory. Therefore the well known formula to
calculate the inter temporal rate of time preference, out of parameters of the RA structural
demand equation, does not apply in this case. Results from the semi-reduced system cannot
be interpreted in the sense of accepting or rejecting the theoretical assumptions implied by the
RA model. However, the coeﬃcients of the semi-reduced system can be used to calculate own,
cross price and income elasticities; to test for the existence of a gateway eﬀect and to draw
important policy implications.
5 Data and Empirical Strategy
5 . 1 A l c o h o la n dT o b a c c oC o n s u m p t i o ni nI t a l y
In the year 2000 average per capita consumption of pure alcohol in Italy was about 7.5 litres
(Ministero della Salute, 2003, p. 12), but according to the WHO for the European Region, the
target of 6 litres per capita per year should be reached by the year 2015. Alcohol consumption
has followed a decreasing trend since the early eighties: per capita consumption of an aggregate
of beer, wine and spirits has decreased, between 1970 and 2001, by 51.25%.
The Italian Institute of Health (Scafato and Russo, 2004, p. 4), reports that the total
per capita decrease in alcohol consumption from 1981 to 2000 results from a 40.8% decrease
in wine consumption; a 65.7 % decrease in spirits consumption and a 57% increase in beer
consumption.
At the same time, however, the following changes have occurred: a) an increase in the
number of female consumers; b) an increase in the number of young consumers (teen agers and
people aged 18 to 24); c) an increase in the number of people (and the increase is higher for
females and the young) consuming alcohol outside the main meals. The increase in the number
of alcohol consumers on one hand and the sharp decrease in per capita level of consumption, on
the other, seem to reveal a change in habits. Italy is a producer country where, traditionally,
wine has been consumed, on average, in moderate quantities and by all members of the house-
hold, to accompany meals. This pattern seems to suggest a transition from a Mediterranean
model to one closer to the Northern European countries characterised by binge drinking and by
the use of alcohol as a bridge to ease personal relationships and wane down social discomfort or
as a means of female emancipation and cultural homologation. If this is true, then the steady
decrease in alcohol consumption could hide a rather diﬀerent picture such as an increase in the
10number of people actually at risk, especially among the most fragile groups of society.
As to smoking behaviour, Italy is one of the industrialised countries with a very high
percentage of daily smokers (OECD, 2002). The Italian National Statistical Oﬃce (ISTAT,
2002b) estimates that in the year 2000 smokers in Italy were 12.330.000, about 24.9% of the
population older than 14. Among those, 22.9% were abitual smokers (those that smoke every
day) and 40.9% heavy smokers (those declaring to smoke more than 20 cigarettes per day).
Smoking in Italy is highly inﬂuenced by sex, age, location and the level of education attained.
There are more male smokers than females (32% of males smoke against about 18% of females)
and the highest share of smokers is registered in North-West and Central Italy (26.2%), followed
by the Islands (24.5%), the South (23.8%) and the North-East (23.5%).
Households’ expenditure on tobacco, at constant 1995 prices, has grown between 1982
and 1986 and has decreased steadily between 1987 and 1995 (ISTAT, 2002a). Since then
expenditure on tobacco has almost remained stable. However, this decrease is likely to be due,
at least partly, to the rapid increase in cigarette smuggling, estimated to have grown by about
800% between 1985 and 1993 and to account for about 13% of all cigarettes consumed.
5.2 Data
We use aggregate time series of alcoholic beverages’ and tobacco products’ expenditures (both
in Billions Euro) in Italy for the period 1960-2002 taken from ISTAT National Accounts. The
use of aggregate data implies a number of drawbacks: ﬁrst, they may be dominated by the
behavior of light and moderate drinkers or smokers and a decrease in aggregate consumption
of alcohol, for instance, could hide a rather diﬀerent trend in consumption of each alcoholic
beverage (beer, wine and spirits). Secondly, addictive behavior could be more easily captured
by data on spirits consumption and on cigarettes consumption only, because the distribution
of spirits and cigarettes is tipically more bimodal than that of other alcoholics or tobacco
products6. Finally, Auld and Grootendorst (2004) have argued that estimable RA models tend
to yield spurious evidence in favor of the RA hypothesis when aggregate time series are used.
More speciﬁcally, spurious evidence in favour of RA is likely to be obtained when: 1) the
consumption series is highly correlated; 2) even a small amount of the variation in prices is
endogenous; 3) the value of the discount rate is exogenously imposed and, 4), over identiﬁed
6Bimodal distribution is an outcome of the Becker-Murphy theory of addiction and it implies that there are
few consumers of small or moderate quantities of addictive goods and a majority either not consuming at all
or consuming large quantities of the highly addictive good.
11instrumental variable estimators are used.
Per capita values are obtained by dividing aggregate expenditures of both commodities by
population older than 14 (calculated in the middle of each year)7. The real price of alcoholics
and tobacco is obtained by dividing the implicit deﬂator, calculated as the ratio between
current expenditure and expenditure at 1995 prices, by the consumer price index (1995=1).
Summary statistics and details of the data used are presented in table 2. Figure 1 shows an
index (1995=1) of per capita expenditures and their real prices normalized in 1995.











Figure 1: Index (1995=1) of per capita (age >14) alcohol expenditure (AL), per capita
tobacco expenditure (TB), real alcohol price (PA) and real tobacco price (PT).
5.3 Diagnostic Tests on Time Series
A number of diagnostic tests have been performed in order to avoid biases towards ﬁnding
rational addiction, as suggested by Auld and Grootendorst (2004). First we have tested for
price exogeneity performing a Hausman-Wu (HW) test8. This is a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test
7We also have carried out estimations on data in aggregate levels (without dividing by the population) and
on per capita levels that take into account the total population.
8The HW test compares the original demand equation (estimated with OLS) with the unrestricted model
that includes, among the explanatory variables, the residuals of an auxiliary regression. In the auxiliary
12distributed as a χ2 with 34 degrees of freedom. Both for alcohol and for tobacco we accept the
null hypothesis of price and disposable income exogeneity.
We have also checked for stationarity of the series using an Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
test. First we have assumed that the data generating process (DGP) is AR(1) with a constant
added (random walk with drift) and we have considered the following as a DGP for all the
series: ∆zt = azt−1 + b1∆zt−1 + bp∆zt−p + c + ut where z is the variable under consideration,
ut is white noise, c is the intercept and t = p+2,...,n. The null hypothesis is that zt is a unit
root process, i.e. a =0and the test statistic is the t-value of a.
The problem with the ADF is that it is an asymptotic test that may be biased when applied
to small samples. For this reason we have also simulated the actual p-value of the ADF test
using bootstrapping: the errors have been drawn from a normal distribution with zero mean,
variance equal to the squared OLS residuals and a p-value has been calculated based on 500
simulations. Both tests reveal the presence of a unit root for all the variables but PT
9.R e s u l t s
of unit root tests are shown in table 310. All estimations have been therefore carried out
with the model in ﬁrst diﬀerences. Finally we have tested for autocorrelation of the diﬀerenced
variables using two diﬀerent tests: a Durbin’h alternative and a Breusch/Godfrey LM test. For
all autocorrelation tests we reject the null of no autocorrelation11 and accept the hypothesis
of serial correlation of order 2 in the error terms of the diﬀerenced model. Results of these
diagnostic tests are shown in table 3.
5.4 Estimating the rational co-addiction model
Without loss of generality, we sketch estimation of equation (4). The same methods are used
to estimate the other behavioural equation (5). A suitable transformation to eliminate the
problems of spurious regression, is the following transformation in ﬁrst-diﬀerences:
regression the real price is the dependent variable whereas the explanatory variables include a linear time
trend, a constant and the aggregate quantity of Alcoholic beverages or of Tobacco sold.
9PT is a stationary series when the ADF is applied. However a Phillips-Perron test carried out on the same
series accepts the null of a unit root in the DGP.
10Unit root tests have been performed using the EasyReg software by prof. Bierens.
11The Durbin’s h alternative follows a normal distribution and it is a valid test for autocorrelation when
more than one lagged dependent variable is included in the regressors.
The Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation of order x follows a χ2 distribution with DF = x +k −1,
where x is the number of lags and k is the number of identiﬁed coeﬃcients in the model, including the intercept.
13∆At = β10+β11∆At−1+β12∆At+1+β13∆Tt−1+β14∆Tt+β15∆Tt+1+β16∆pAt +β17∆Yt+∆εt
(4a)
where t =3 ,...,T −1; εt is the error term; and Yt,w h i c hi sa ne m p i r i c a lm o d i ﬁcation of the
theoretical model, is a vector of exogenous determinants that inﬂuence alcohol and tobacco
consumption. In our case, the vector Yt contains only one element, namely, the real per capita
expenditure used as a proxy of disposable income.
There are two problems that prevent the linear expression (4a) from being estimated by
ordinary least squares. First, there is an omitted variable bias due to uncounted demand
shifters that may also be serially correlated. Second, there is measurement error when we use
actual values in period t+1for planned future consumptions of both addictive goods (Picone,
2005).
The common strategy when facing such endogeneity problems is to assume that there exists
a vector of instruments, which may include one or all of covariates, and apply the generalized
method of moments (GMM)12.T h elx1vector of instruments, Zt,s a y ,i su n c o r r e l a t e dw i t ht h e
disturbance and correlated with the explanatory variables and satisﬁes the set of l orthogonality
conditions E (Zt∆εt)=0 . The sample analogue of these moment conditions is given by the
column vector n−1 Pn
t=1 Zt∆ε =0or, dropping the factor n−1 and using matrix notation,
Z0∆ε =0 . If the model is overidentiﬁed, i.e. the number of independent moment conditions
is greater than the number of estimated parameters (l>k ), the GMM estimator of the linear
















































where,X =[ 1 ,∆A−1,∆A+1,∆T−1,∆T,∆T+1,∆pA,∆Y ], Z (nxl) is an instrument matrix
to be deﬁned, and ω(lxl) is a weighting matrix. Note that while the GMM estimator depends
12For a comprehensive discussion on generalized method of moments see Davidson and MacKinnon (1993,
chapter 17), Hall (2005), Hansen (2005, chapter 5), Hayashi (2000, chapter 3), and Matyàs (2003), to cite a
few.
14on ω, the dependence is only up to a scalar. An optimal weighting matrix, i.e., one which
minimizes the asymptotic variance of the estimator, is not known in practice, but can be
estimated consistently. Since the optimal weighting matrix is a function of β,w en e e dat w o -
step procedure. In the ﬁrst step, we use the fact that a consistent yet not eﬃcient estimate of the
parameters’ vector may be obtained with an arbitrary positive deﬁnite and symmetric weighting
matrix which does not depend on β. For example, we can set b ω1 = Il,o rb ω1 = n−1Z0Z. Observe
that, in the linear model the latter choice implies that the ﬁrst step estimator is the two stage
least squares estimator, originally proposed by Theil (1953). In the second step, any such
preliminary estimate of β is used to form b ω = n−1Z0∆b ε∆b ε
0Z where ∆b ε is a consistent estimate
of the disturbance and obtain b βGMM.
After some experimentation, we have chosen as instruments a set that is a combination of
p a s ta n df u t u r ep r i c e sa n de x p e n d i t u r eb o t hi nl e v e l sa n di nd i ﬀerences: ∆pAt, ∆pAt−2, ∆pAt−3,
pAt−1,p At−2, pAt+1,p At+2, ∆pTt, ∆pTt−2, ∆pTt−3,p Tt+1,p Tt+2,p Tt−1,p Tt−2, ∆Yt, ∆Yt−2, ∆Yt−3,Y t−1,
Yt−2, Yt+1,Y t+2 and the constant.
6R e s u l t s
We have carried out diﬀerent sets of estimations. First, the model in equations (4) and (5)
is estimated as two separate structural equations with all the variables in ﬁrst diﬀerences.
Past and future consumption of both goods are treated as endogenous in each equation so
we use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator which produces consistent and
asymptotically eﬃcient estimates of the parameters of interest. As Auld and Grootendorst
(2004, p. 17) have noted, estimating the model in diﬀerences is likely to yield better small-
sample properties than estimation in levels for commodities exhibiting moderate to high serial
correlation in consumption. The validity of the over identifying restrictions is tested using the
Sargan or J test. Standard errors are computed from an heteroscedastic-consistent covariance
matrix of the orthogonality conditions using the White procedure. We also control for serial
correlation of the disturbances using a covariance matrix of the orthogonality conditions that
incorporates Moving Average (MA) disturbances of order 2. The results are shown in table 4.
In the alcohol equation current alcohol consumption is positively aﬀected by lagged and lead
consumption. The lead consumption coeﬃcient is also lower than the lagged one as expected
so that the rate of inter temporal preferences is positive. Alcohol demand is also negatively
aﬀected by its own price and by current tobacco consumption. The coeﬃcients of lagged and
lead consumption in the tobacco equation are positive and signiﬁcant, but this time the rate of
15time preference is negative because the lead consumption coeﬃcient is larger than the lagged
consumption one. Also current tobacco demand is negatively aﬀected by current and future
alcohol consumption. Finally, alcohol seems to be a gate to tobacco because lagged alcohol
consumption is positive and signiﬁcant in this case. The long run demand elasticities are all
negative (see table 5), but tobacco consumption is more sensitive to own price variations than
alcohol. The cross price elasticity of alcohol with respect to tobacco is negative, thus signalling
complementarity, whereas the other cross price elasticity is very close to zero, but also scarcely
signiﬁcant. Finally, the expenditure elasticity of alcohol is > 1 and has been growing over the
whole sample period 1960-2002, showing that alcohol is a luxury.
A second set of results refers to the simultaneous estimation of the semi-reduced system.
Our empirical implementation is based on a variant of (6) and (7), with all the variables in
ﬁrst diﬀerences as follows:
∆At = α10 + α11∆At−1 + α12∆At+1 + α13∆Tt−1 + α14∆Tt+1 + α15∆pAt + α16∆pTt + α17∆Yt (12)
∆Tt = α20 + α21∆Tt−1 + α22∆Tt+1 + α23∆At−1 + α24∆At+1 + α25∆pTt + α26∆pAt + α27∆Yt (13)
where αi0, i =1 ,2, is an intercept term and Yi is real per capita ﬁnal consumption ex-
penditure used as a proxy of disposable income. If the model is correctly speciﬁed one should
have α10 = α20 =0 . However, we allow for a non-zero intercept in all estimations in order
to avoid mis speciﬁcation bias in the other parameters. The set of instruments used is the
same as in the previous estimations. These results are shown in table 6. Concerning alcohol,
the lag and lead consumption are statistically signiﬁcant, have the expected sign and the lead
coeﬃc i e n ti sl o w e rt h a nt h el a g g e do n e ,s ot h a tt h ei n t e rt e m p o r a lr a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c ei s
positive. Alcohol price is also statistically signiﬁc a n t ,a sw e l la sd i s p o s a b l ei n c o m ea n df u t u r e
tobacco consumption. However, as before, lagged tobacco consumption is negative and is not
statistically signiﬁcant. As to the tobacco equation, all the coeﬃcients, except for lagged alco-
hol consumption and disposable income, are statistically signiﬁcant and take on the expected
sign. In this case, however, a positive coeﬃcient for the lead consumption of each good in each
equation is just evidence that consumers are forward looking and not that the RA theory is
supported by the data. This is because, as stated previously, the signs of the parameters in the
semi-reduced system cannot be deduced from the theory. Even in this case there is no evidence
of a gateway eﬀect in either direction. The test of over identifying restrictions is distributed as
a χ2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of exceeding instruments. The critical value
of the χ2 at the 95% level of signiﬁcance with 22 degrees of freedom is 12.391 [p-value 0.949],
16we cannot therefore reject the null of no over identiﬁcation.
Direct and cross price long run elasticities of demand calculated at the sample mean, as
well as the income elasticities of demand are shown in table 7. Standard errors have been
computed using the delta method. Own and cross price elasticities indicate that the coeﬃcients
are accurately estimated and in line with those calculated in similar studies. As to direct price
elasticities all responses are smaller than unity, but alcohol appears to be less sensitive to price
variations than tobacco. The same holds for cross price elasticities of demand. This contrasts
with previous ﬁndings where the cross price elasticity of alcohol with respect to tobacco price is
greater, in absolute value, than the cross price elasticity of tobacco with respect to alcohol. Both
elasticities are negative implying that the two goods are complement, but they are asymmetric
in magnitude. Goel and Morey (1995, p. 456), who found a similar result, view this as potential
evidence of diﬀerences in social norms regarding smoking and drinking, i.e. it may be that
the intersection of smokers and liquor drinkers constitutes a much larger proportion in the
population of alcohol consumers than it does in the population of smokers.
The statistical signiﬁcance of cross price eﬀects bears important implications for taxation
and health policies. In this case, for example, measures aimed at reducing alcohol consumption
m i g h tp r o d u c et h ea d d i t i o n a le ﬀect of reducing tobacco consumption as well. Moreover alcohol
is a luxury good as the income elasticity of demand is 1.81. Figures 2 to 5 show the time series,
1960-2002, of own, cross price and income elasticities. Tobacco has always been more price
sensitive, throughout the period and is also more sensitive to variations in the price of alcohol
(ﬁgure 3). This ﬁnding suggests that increases in the price of alcohol would be eﬀective also
in reducing tobacco consumption. It also seems consistent with the intuition by Goel and
Morey (1995) who stress a presumed asymmetry in the proportion of people who drink and
also smoke: drinkers seem to get more easily hooked in smoking behaviour than smokers do
in drinking behaviour. Lastly, from ﬁgure 4, we may see how the income elasticity of alcohol
consumption has been growing over time and has always been greater than one, i.e. alcoholic
beverages are luxuries throughout the period. If the income elasticity of alcohol consumption
is also growing across income classes, then alcohol taxation would have a progressive impact,
contrary to the conventional wisdom that taxation of "sin" goods is regressive, and would thus
be more equitable than tobacco taxation even from a distributional view point.
A ﬁnal set of results refers to the estimation of the structural demand equations with the
additional restriction of a linear common stock. Pacula (1998, p. 9) stresses that in order to
test for a gateway eﬀect one should have a single stock representing the cumulative inﬂuence
of past consumption of both substances. When a linear common habit stock is assumed, the
17following structural demand equations can be derived from the RA theory:
At = β10 + β11(At−1 + Tt−1)+β12At+1 + β13Tt + β14Tt+1 + β15pAt (14)
Tt = β20 + β21(Tt−1 + At−1)+β22Tt+1 + β23At + β24At+1 + β25pTt (15)
In this model, past consumption of alcohol and tobacco have the same impact on current
demand. Testing whether this restriction holds can be considered a test of the hypothesis
of a linear common habit stock. However, specifying the common stock as a linear additive
function implies: i) that alcohol and tobacco are perfect substitutes in consumption; ii) that,
if the coeﬃcients βi1 (i =1 ,2) turn out to be positive and statistically signirifcant, there
is a symmetric gateway eﬀect between the two goods, i.e. past consumption of alcohol and
tobacco has an equal eﬀect on current consumption of each good. Since both implications
are unreasonable when the goods involved are alcohol and tobacco, we expect to reject the
hypothesis of a linear common habit stock and of a gateway eﬀect of this kind13.
We have performed a LM test on each of the two equations. The null hypothesis is given by
the restricted model and the LM test statistic follows a chi-square distribution with DF equal
to the number of restrictions. For the alcohol equation, the LM statistic with 1 DF is 6.202,
whereas the χ2 distribution value at the 95% of signiﬁcance is 3.83, we thus reject the null. In
the tobacco equation the LM statistic is 5.019, therefore we reject the null of a linear common
habit stock for alcohol and tobacco, as expected.
6.1 Policy Implications
In order to draw some policy implications, we have used the GMM estimates of equations (12)
and (13) to evaluate the eﬀects on consumption of both commodities of a change in Alcohol
price only from the year 2003. In our simulation real prices are actual ones up until 2002, but
we assume a 3% per year growth rate in the real price of Alcohol during the period 2003-2016.
The real price of Tobacco and the proxy of disposable income are instead assumed to grow at
a rate equal to their past trend. To simulate equations (12) and (13) beyond the estimation
period (i.e. after 2002) we need to know the expected future consumption values for both
13Bask and Melkersson (2000) model the common stock as a linear additive function when tobacco and
smuggling tobacco are the goods involved. In this case it makes sense to assume perfect substitution between
the two goods, because they are the same good, it is only the institutional setting that is diﬀerent.
18Alcohol and Tobacco. These are generated through OLS estimation of the following set of
equations from 1963 to 1999, where instruments only are used as explanatory variables:
At = c0 + c1pAt + c2pAt−1 + c3pAt−2 + c4pAt+1 + c5pAt+2 + c6yt + c7yt−1 + c8yt−2
+c9yt+1 + c10yt+2 + c11pTt−1 + c12pTt−2 + c13pTt+1 + c14pTt+2 + uAt (16)
Tt = d0 + d1pTt + d2pTt−1 + d3pTt−2 + d4pTt+1 + d5pTt+2 + d6yt + d7yt−1 + d8yt−2 (17)
+d9yt+1 + d10yt+2 + d11pAt−1 + d12pAt−2 + d13pAt+1 + d14pAt+2 + uTt
Equations (16-17) are estimated for the years 2003 - 2020 using as prices those generated as
described above. Given these exogenous information on At+1,T t+1,p At,p Tt and Yt ,e q u a t i o n s
(12) and (13) are dynamically simulated from 1962 to 2016. Results of this exercise are shown
in ﬁgure 5 and table 8. When an increase of 3% per year in Alcohol price is assumed, the
consumption of both commodities decreases as a consequence of complementarity between
them. Even though the proportional reduction in Tobacco consumption is lower, acting on
Alcohol price only seems to be enough to aﬀect both demands.
7 Concluding comments
This paper investigates the inter relationship between alcohol and tobacco consumption. A
range of empirical evidence emphasizes that these goods are often jointly consumed, thus it
is likely that they are related in consumption. An understanding of their interdependence is
important for a number of reasons. It may help designing appropriate policy measures aimed at
reducing the negative externalities associated with their consumption. It may reveal whether
t h e r ei sag a t e w a ye ﬀect between the two.
We model the demand for the two addictive goods as an extension of the RA model that
allows for multi-commodity addictions.
Our results reveal that there is a strong habit persistence eﬀect in both alcohol and tobacco
consumption and, also, that both demands reﬂect a forward looking behaviour since the lead
consumption terms, in each equation, are positive and signiﬁc a n t . W ec a n n o ts a y ,h o w e v e r ,
from these ﬁndings, whether the joint demand for alcohol and tobacco is well portrayed by the
rational addiction model.
Our analysis also reveals that the two goods are complements in consumption since both
cross price elasticities are negative. Thus, a policy measure that is eﬀective in reducing the
19demand in one of the two would also produce the additional result of curbing the demand of
the other. More speciﬁcally, the cross price elasticity of tobacco with respect to alcohol price
is greater in absolute value than the response of alcohol consumption to a change in the price
of tobacco.
The asymmetry in the values of the cross price elasticities coupled with the relative mag-
nitude of the own price elasticities seems to suggest that the optimal strategy for maximizing
public revenues through increases in "sin" excise taxation would be to raise alcohol taxation
more than tobacco. This policy measure would also produce the additional dividend of curb-
ing tobacco demand, given the absolute values of the cross price elasticities. Moreover, alcohol
turns out to be a luxury across the whole sample 1960-2002 (see ﬁgure 4). If the income
elasticity of alcohol consumption is also growing across income classes, then, contrary to the
conventional wisdom that views taxation of "sin" goods as regressive, alcohol taxation could
have a progressive impact. This would make alcohol more suitable than tobacco for increases
in excise taxation.
Such conclusions should be taken with some caution. On one hand, the level of aggregation
in our data may conceal individual attributes hanving an inﬂuence in consumption of alcohol
and tobacco. Moreover, we could only partly account for the suggestions of Auld and Groo-
tendorst (2004) when dealing with aggregate time series data in estimating rational addiction
models. The use of data at the individual level is likely to produce more reliable results.
Finally, an interesting topic that has not been extensively explored in the literature is
the possibility of a common habit stock between alcohol and tobacco products. While some
stilized facts seem to suggest that smoking and drinking often go together, thus admitting a
contemporary relationship between the two, there are few empirical tests of the hypothesis of
an inter temporal relationship, introduced by Pacula (1997). In this case the joint consumption
of the two goods may give rise to a common habit stock and to a gateway eﬀect. We have
explored the possibility of a linear common stock between alcohol and tobacco which implies
perfect substitution between the two. As expected, though, this assumption is rejected by the
data. An appropriate speciﬁcation of the common stock is thus needed to properly test for a
gateway eﬀect between alcohol and tobacco consumption.
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23Table 1: Empirical Studies on the Interaction between Alcohol and Tobacco
DATA MODEL DYNAMIC SPECIFICATION CONTEMPORANEOUS INTERACTION
εa,t εt,a
Jones (1989)* Quarterly aggregate AID system Habit Formation −0.46 −0.46
time series
Jimenez-Labeaga (1994) Cross section, AID system Static - −0.78
individual data
Goel-Morey (1995) Pooled time series two separate Habit Formation −0.33 +0.10
and cross-sections linear equations
Dee (1999) Pooled time series two separate Static --
and cross-sections linear equations
Decker-Schwartz (2000) Cross section, two separate Static +0.50 −0.14
individual data linear equations
Bask-Melkersson (2004)§ Annual aggregate simultaneous linear Rational Addiction +0.79 −0.31
time series equations
Fanelli-Mazzocchi (2004) Quarterly aggregate Dynamic AIDS Rational Addiction −0.50 +0.01
time series
Picone et al. (2004) Panel, two separate Habit Formation - -
individual data linear equations
* The values of the cross price elasticies are referred to spirits and tobacco. Symmetry is imposed in estimation.
§T h ev a l u e sa r er e f e r r e dt ot h eG M M ( b )e s t i m a t i o n .
24Table 2: Deﬁnitions, Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) of Variables
Variable Deﬁnition, mean (M), Standard Deviation (SD)
CTt =( TBQ/N14)100 Per capita (of persons aged 14 or older) Tobacco expenditure
(1995=1); (M=0.968; SD=0.256)
CAt Per capita (of persons aged 14 or older) Alcohol expenditure
(1995=1); (M=1.351; SD=0.241)
PTt =( TBV t/TBQt)/PGt Real price of Tobacco products (1995=1)
(M=0.974; SD=0.263)
PA t =( ALVt/ALQt)/PGt Real price of Alcoholic beverages (1995=1)
(M=1.139; SD=0.161)
TBQ t Aggregate expenditure on Tobacco products, at constant
1995 prices (millions Euro); ( M=8252.438; SD=2550.896)
TBV t Aggregate expenditure on Tobacco products at current prices
(millions Euro); (M=4198.528; SD=4176.161)
ALQt Aggregate expenditure in alcoholic beverages, at constant
1995 prices (millions Euro); (M=5417.678; SD=837.055)
ALVt Aggregate expenditure on alcoholic beverages at current prices
(millions Euro); (M=2577.546; SD=1882.417)
Yt = Y 95t/N14 Real per capita disposable income per year (1995=1)
(M=0.783; SD=0.234)
Y 95t Households’ ﬁnal consumption expenditure per year used as a proxy
of disposable income (in Billions Lire) (M=29850.430; SD=37495.442
N14 Population aged 14 or older calculated in the middle of each year
(in Millions units)
PG t Consumer price index (CPI) (1995=100)
(M=0.481; SD=0.406)
25Table 3: Diagnostic Tests on Time Series (p-values in parentheses)
1. Pri c e 2 .U n i tR o o t 3 .A u t o c o r r e l a t i o n
exogeneity (diﬀerenced model)
PT PA PT PA CT CA DCT DCA
1. LR(HW) test 0.203 0.137
(1.000) (1.000)
2a ADF -3.473 -0.202 -0.193 -0.647
(0.010) (0.240) (0.080) (0.860)
Bootstrapping (0.054) (0.680) (0.174) (0.734)
3a Durbin’s h Alt. -2.251 -2.327
(0.024) (0.020)
3b Breusch-Godfrey 5.065 5.416
(0.024) (0.020)
26Table 4: GMM Estimates of the demand for alcohol and tobacco
estimated separately, (standard errors in parentheses)
Alcohol equation Tobacco equation
Tt -0.211 (0.157) At -0.096 (0.061)
∆At−1 0.319 (0.094) ∆At−1 0.094 (0.050)
∆At+1 0.230 (0.158) ∆At+1 -0.026 (0.061)
∆Tt−1 -0.066 (0.149) ∆Tt−1 0.215 (0.082)
∆Tt+1 0.403 (0.192) ∆Tt+1 0.491 (0.102)
∆pAt -0.136 (0.056) ∆pTt -0.185 (0.082)
∆Yt 1.333 (0.357) ∆Yt 0.154 (0.121)
αA -0.032 (0.008) αT 0




Standard errors are both heteroscedastic consistent and robust to autocorrelation:
the disturbance terms are speciﬁed as a second order moving average process.
27Table 5: Elasticities of demand at the sample mean
and discount rates (standard errors in parentheses)
parameters P-value
εAA -0.248 (0.156) [0.113]
εAT -0.124 (0.166) [0.457]
εTT -0.618 (0.111) [0.000]
εTA 0.033 (0.057) [0.560]
εAY 1.754 (0.462) [0.000]
εTY 0.192 (0.582) [0.742]
rA 38.570 (116.135) [0.740]
rT -56.183 (18.804) [0.003]
Standard errors have been computed using the delta method.
28Table 6: GMM Estimates of the semi-reduced system,
non common habit stock (standard errors in parentheses)
Alcohol equation Tobacco equation
∆At−1 0.266 (0.085) 0.010 (0.051)
∆At+1 0.208 (0.122) 0.374 (0.048)
∆Tt−1 -0.189 (0.207) 0.113 (0.087)
∆Tt+1 0.462 (0.175) 0.374 (0.048)
∆pAt -0.154 (0.067) -0.118 (0.034)
∆pTt 0.019 (0.060) -0.257 (0.036)
∆Yt 1.440 (0.407) 0.021 (0.215)
α10 -0.037 (0.006)
α20 0.005 (0.004)




Standard errors are both heteroscedastic consistent and robust to autocorrelation:
the disturbance terms are speciﬁed as a second order moving average process.
29Table 7: Elasticities at the sample mean from
the semi-reduced system (standard errors in parentheses)
parameters P-Value
εAA -0.394 (0.130) [0.002]
εAT -0.184 (0.078) [0.000]
εTT -0.563 (0.081) [0.018]
εTA -0.396 (0.162) [0.015]
εAY 1.813 (0.447) [0.000]
εTY 0.602 (0.298) [0.043]
Standard errors have been computed using the delta method.
Table 8: Variation (%) in Alcohol (DCA) and Tobacco
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Figure 2: Own Price Elasticities of Demand: Alcohol (1) and Tobacco(2)
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Figure 3: Cross Price Elasticities for Alcohl (1) and Tobacco (2)
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Figure 4: Income Elasticities for Alcohol (1) and Tobacco (2)












Figure 5: Eﬀects of a change in Alcohol price on Alcohol and Tobacco expenditure (millions
of Euros 1995). CA0, CT0 = levels of alcohol (CA0) and tobacco (CT0) expenditure
assuming a growth rate in real prices of both goods, from 2003 to 2016, equal to the past
trends in prices. CA1 = level of Alcohol expenditure assuming a growth rate of 3 % per year
in Alcohol price.
33